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Abstract
We present an empirical implementation of a general-equilibrium model of interna-
tional trade with heterogeneous manufacturing ﬁrms. The theory underlying our model
is consistent with Melitz (2003). A nonlinear structural estimation procedure identiﬁes
a set of core parameters and unobserved ﬁrm-level trade frictions that best ﬁt the ge-
ographic pattern of trade. Once the parameters are identiﬁed, we utilize a decomposi-
tion technique for computing general-equilibrium counterfactuals. We ﬁrst assess the
economic effects of reductions in measured tariffs. Taking the simple-average welfare
change across regions the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization
that are nearly four times larger than in a standard trade policy simulation. Further-
more, when we compare the economic impact of tariff reductions with reductions in
estimated ﬁxed trade costs we ﬁnd that policy measures affecting the ﬁxed costs are of
greater importance than tariff barriers. (JEL C68,F12)
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In canonical models of international trade, trade-policy changes induce factors of produc-
tion to move between industries. Recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest
that within-industry factor movements may also be an important channel through which
policy affects economic outcomes. More productive plants are more likely to engage in ex-
porting, so trade liberalization allows a reallocation of factors from less- to more-productive
plants. Melitz (2003) derives a model that makes qualitative predictions about these phe-
nomena. We evaluate the quantitative signiﬁcance of these insights within the Melitz frame-
work.1
Recent papers in the geography-of-trade literature use structural assumptions and the
bilateraltradepatterntomakeinferencesaboutthesizeofunobservedtradecosts. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) develop a structural estimation technique that can be used to infer
trade costs.2 Balistreri and Hillberry (2007) develop an extensive-form estimation strategy
for the same model, and argue that it can be extended to most general equilibrium models
of trade.3 Balistreri and Hillberry (2008) link structural estimation techniques to established
methods for calibrating general equilibrium models. We adapt these methods to calibrate
a multi-sector, multi-region general equilibrium model in which the manufacturing sector
has a Melitz-style market structure.
A key technical challenge in the development of this method is an algorithm for efﬁcient
solution of a multi-dimensional model with heterogeneity in plant level productivity. This is
computationally difﬁcult because the model requires joint solution of the trade equilibrium
and a host of entry conditions identifying marginal ﬁrms. To solve this problem, we decom-
1Alvarez and Lucas (2007) evaluate the consequences of tariff reductions in the Eaton and Kortum (2003)
model. Our exercise is motivated along similar lines, but focuses on the Melitz (2003) model.
2Eaton and Kortum (2003) and Behrens et al. (2008) engage in similar exercises, using structural assump-
tions to infer trade costs from the bilateral trade pattern.
3Su and Judd (2008) suggest a similar, extensive-form, technique as a general strategy for structural estima-
tion of economic models.
1pose the general equilibrium into an industry-speciﬁc module which determines the indus-
trial organization and a general equilibrium module which evaluates relative prices, com-
parative advantage and the terms of trade. The full general equilibrium solution is achieved
through a convergent iterative procedure in which the exchange equilibrium is solved con-
ditional on the industrial organization.
Our structural estimation procedure uses the equations deﬁned by the numeric model
as a series of side constraints on the econometric objective. The model is underidentiﬁed,
but assumptions about a few key structural parameters allow the econometric procedure to
complete the identiﬁcation of both the production technology and average bilateral trade
costs. Leaning heavily on our structural model, we attribute differences between observed
and ﬁtted bilateral trade in manufactured goods to unobserved ﬁxed costs of trade. This
interpretation allows for an exact calibration of the model, without any role for idiosyncratic
preferences in manufacturing trade.4
Thekeystructuralparametersofthemodelarethedistanceelasticityofadvaloremtrade
costsandtheparameterdeﬁningtheshapeoftheParetodistributionofﬁrmlevelproductiv-
ities. We estimate these under three different sets of identifying assumptions. Our preferred
speciﬁcation ties down the distance elasticity of trade costs, using unexplained variation in
the trade pattern to ﬁt the implied shape of the productivity distribution. Our estimate of
this parameter is largely consistent with estimates from the conﬁdential plant-level data.
With our general equilibrium system fully parameterized, we proceed to a quantitative
assessment of the effect of trade policy changes. Using a standard Armington structure as
the benchmark, we consider a 50 percent reduction in manufacturing tariffs. As expected,
endogenous productivity changes and growth in the number of imported varieties lead to
largerwelfarechangesintheMelitzmodelthanintheArmingtonbaseline. Takingthesimple-
average welfare change across regions, the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from lib-
4Hillberry et al. (2005) highlight and critique the role of idiosyncratic preference biases in determining the
trade equilibrium in Computable General Equilibrium models.
2eralization that are nearly four times larger than those from the baseline model. We also
consider reductions in the inferred bilateral ﬁxed costs, and ﬁnd that the welfare gains from
these changes are substantially larger.5 Joint reductions of tariffs and the inferred ﬁxed costs
of trade generate even larger welfare gains. When we reduce both tariffs and ﬁxed border
costs by 50% the average welfare gain is nearly 30 times larger than in the case of tariff cuts
in the Armington structure.
In section 2 we provide a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a brief re-
view of the Melitz (2003) theory as it relates to our application. Section 4 details a practical
method for numerically solving the heterogeneous-ﬁrms model. In Section 5 we outline
the nonlinear estimation procedure, and estimate the structural parameters that allow the
model to best ﬁt the data. These parameters are used to calibrate an operational general
equilibrium model, which we employ to conduct counterfactual analysis. The results of this
analysis appear in section 6. In section 7 we discuss implications of our work and directions
for further research.
2 Literature Review
Two broad areas of the empirical trade literature motivate heterogeneous-ﬁrms models like
those proposed in Melitz (2003) or Bernard et al. (2007).
First, an extensive literature documents heterogeneity across establishments in produc-
tivity, export behavior, and responses to trade shocks. Important ﬁndings from this liter-
ature include a) there is wide variation in productivity levels among coexisting plants;6 b)
only a small fraction of establishments engage in exporting, and exporters tend to be larger
5As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2003), and Behrens et al. (2008), these exer-
cises should be seen as illustrative calculations about the value of a signiﬁcant move toward full integration,
rather than as an assessment of particular trade policy changes.
6This is a robust feature of the data, as discussed in Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
3and more productive than non-exporters;7 c) there is considerable heterogeneity among ex-
porters in the number of markets served per ﬁrm;8 d) within-industry reallocation of market
share from less-productive to more-productive establishments is an important component
of aggregate productivity growth;9 and e) productivity growth via shifting market shares (in-
cluding the exit of the lowest productivity plants) is an important channel through which
trade cost reductions induce aggregate productivity growth.10
Second, a recent literature has focussed attention on the extensive margin of trade. Sev-
eral authors have linked variation in aggregate trade ﬂows to variation in the number of a)
ﬁrms trading, b) commodities traded, and c) trading partners.11 Of particular interest in this
literature is explaining trade growth via this extensive margin.12
In a critique of the performance of applied general equilibrium models commonly used
in trade policy analysis, Kehoe (2005) argues that the models typically fail along two dimen-
sions: they do not allow trade policy to affect aggregate productivity, and they do not allow
trade policy to induce trade growth along the extensive margin. While some policy esti-
mates include ad hoc productivity adjustments, these attempts do not typically specify the
mechanism by which trade policy is meant to induce productivity growth.13 Analysis of the
extensive margin of trade remains outside the scope of most policy-oriented trade models.
While the empirical literature has demonstrated the relevance of within-industry pro-
ductivity heterogeneity and trade growth via the extensive margin, what has been lacking
until recently is a sound theoretical structure that formalizes the insights from the empirical
literature. Melitz-type models with ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁxed trade costs offer a useful
7See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1999), Roberts and Tybout (1997), and Bernard et al. (2003).
8Eaton et al. (2004) document this using French data.
9See Foster et al. (2001) and Aw et al. (2001), among others. An important component of the contribution of
shifting market share is the exit of less-productive establishments.
10See, for example, Bernard et al. (2006) and Pavcnik (2002).
11Eaton et al. (2004) and Hillberry and Hummels (2008) show that variation in the number of ﬁrms serving
a market explains variation in exports to that market. Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Broda and Weinstein
(2006) identify the extensive margin in terms of the role of added commodities/trading partners.
12See Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) and Evenett and Venables (2002).
13See Anderson et al. (2005) for an example.
4framework for addressing Kehoe’s critique. Trade policy changes affect industry productiv-
ity by shifting market share away from low-productivity non-exporters, and toward high-
productivity exporters. The model also allows for trade growth along the extensive margin,
and provides a mechanism by which such trade growth can be linked to policy changes.
3 Theory
ConsumershaveCobb-Douglasutilityovercommoditybundleswhicharedeﬁnedasconstant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregates of differentiated products. Firms pay a ﬁxed cost
of entry. Entrants receive a random productivity draw. Firms with sufﬁciently low produc-
tivity draws exit, and the remaining ﬁrms produce with a technology exhibiting increasing
returns to scale. Trade costs include ad valorem iceberg costs, revenue-generating tariffs,
and a ﬁxed cost of entering each market. Firms with higher levels of productivity will be able
to proﬁtably serve more markets. The model is simpliﬁed by isolating the characteristics
and behavior of the average ﬁrm participating in each bilateral market. Melitz (2003) devel-
ops the critical links between the average and marginal ﬁrms, and shows how average ﬁrm
characteristics relate to consumer utility.
3.1 Demand
Consumers in region s 2R are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas preferences over composites






5We drop the industry index at this point and isolate the Dixit-Stiglitz composite of manufac-












where !rs indexes the differentiated products sourced from region r 2R (and 
r is the set of
goods produced in r). Substitution across the products is indicated by  =1 1=, where 





















where Nrs is the number of varieties shipped from r to s. Melitz (2003) obtains this sim-
pliﬁcation by noting that ˜ prs is the price set by a small ﬁrm with the CES weighted average
productivity ˜ 'rs.14 Demand for the average variety to be shipped from r to s at a gross of









where Es is the value of total expenditures in region s.15










where rs('rs) is the distribution of productivities of each of the Nrs ﬁrms.
15One problem we face in reconciling the empirical model with the established theory is the discrepancy
between gross expenditures and value added, because of intermediate inputs. To simplify we assume that
intermediate inputs are purchases of the aggregate consumption commodity. Gross expenditures, Es, less the
value of intermediate inputs (to all industries) equals regional income.
63.2 Firm-level environment
We assume a single composite input price, cr, associated with all ﬁxed or marginal costs of
manufacturing in region r. In application, we adopt an upstream Cobb-Douglas technology












diate input. Constant returns in the technology for forming the composite input indicates
that the sum of the share parameters, the , equals one.
Operating ﬁrms in a given market use the composite input to cover both ﬁxed-operating
and marginal costs, but ﬁrms also face an entry cost. The entry cost entitles the ﬁrm to a
productivitydraw. Iftheproductivitydrawissufﬁcientlyhightheﬁrmwilloperateproﬁtably.
Let f e
r indicate the entry cost (in composite-input units), and let Mr denote the number of
entered ﬁrms in region r. Then each of the Mr ﬁrms incur the nominal entry payment cr f e
r ,
although this payment is spread across time (as there is a nonzero probability that the ﬁrm
will survive beyond the current period).
Now consider the input technology for a ﬁrm from region r that ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sell
into market s. Let frs indicate the recurring ﬁxed cost of operating on the r–s link, and let '




units of inputs. Higher productivity (higher ') indicates lower marginal cost.
Onceaﬁrmincurstheentry cost, f e
r ,itissunkandhasnobearingontheﬁrm’sdecisionto
operateinagivenbilateralmarket. Theproﬁtsearnedbyinfra-marginalﬁrmsinthebilateral
7markets do, however, give ﬁrms the incentive to incur the entry cost in the ﬁrst place. There
is no restriction on the markets that can be served by a given member of Mr. If a ﬁrm’s
productivity is high enough such that it is proﬁtable to operate in multiple markets it can
replicate itself, maintaining the same marginal cost but incurring the ﬁxed operating cost,
frs, for each of the s markets it serves.
The small ﬁrms, facing constant-elasticity demand for their differentiated products, fol-
low the usual optimal markup rule. Let rs indicate the iceberg transport-cost factor, and let
trs indicate the tariff. Focusing on the average ﬁrm (with productivity draw ˜ 'rs) shipping





3.3 Operation, Entry, and the Average Firm
We assume that each of the Mr ﬁrms choosing to incur the entry cost receive their ﬁrm-
















where a is the shape parameter andb is the minimum productivity.
Consideringtheﬁxedcostofoperating, frs,onther–s linktherewillbesomelevelofpro-
ductivity, '
rs, at which operating proﬁts are zero. All ﬁrms drawing a ' above '
rs will serve
the s market, and ﬁrms drawing a ' below '
rs will not. A ﬁrm drawing '
rs is the marginal
ﬁrm from r supplying region s. This leads us to the fundamental condition which deter-
mines the number of operating ﬁrms in a given market, Nrs. Let r(') = p(')q(') indicate








than the marginal ﬁrm.
Following Melitz (2003) we deﬁne ˜ ' as the productivity of a ﬁrm pricing at ˜ p, such that
our simpliﬁcation in equation (4) is consistent. The probability that a ﬁrm will operate is























Again, following Melitz (2003) optimal ﬁrm pricing and the input technology (frs +q=') we









Using (12) and (13) to simplify (10) we derive the zero cutoff proﬁt condition in terms of










rs is introduced to track any extra proﬁts that are generated when each of the
Mr ﬁrms operate in a market. We term these proﬁts capacity rents. The value of c
rs must
9be zero in a steady-state, but if Mr is sticky a policy shock might lead to Nrs =Mr indicating
rents.16
Next we turn to the entry condition which determines the mass of ﬁrms, Mr. Firm entry
requires a one-time payment of f e
r , and entered ﬁrms face a probability  in each future
period of a bad shock, which forces exit. In a steady-state equilibrium Mr ﬁrms are lost in
a given period so total entry payments in that period must be crMr f e
r . From an individual
ﬁrm’s perspective the annualized ﬂow of entry payments is crf e
r .
Assuming risk neutrality and no discounting, ﬁrms enter to the point that expected op-
erating proﬁts equal the entry payment. A ﬁrm from r operating in market s can expect to
earn the average proﬁt in that market:
˜ rs =
˜ prs ˜ qrs
(1+trs)
 cr frs. (15)
Using the zero cutoff proﬁt condition to substitute out the operating ﬁxed cost this reduces
to
˜ rs =





The probability that a ﬁrm in r will service the s market is simply given by the ratio of
Nrs=Mr.17 Setting the ﬁrm-level entry-payment ﬂow equal to the expected proﬁts from each













which determines the mass of ﬁrms, Mr.
16The value of c
rs is determined by the variational-inequality presented in the next section, equation (20).
We are only concerned with steady-state equilibria (where c
rs =0) in this study, but we found that the compu-
tational model performed better with the extended condition, which avoids numeric moves where Nrs >Mr.
17In Melitz (2003) the probability that a ﬁrm will operate, which equals the fraction of operating ﬁrms in
equilibrium, is presented as 1 G(').
10Finallywecanrecoverthemarginalproductivityasafunctionofthefractionofoperating












We represent the policy analysis model on the basis of two related equilibrium problems.
The ﬁrst is a partial equilibrium (PE) model which captures the heterogeneous-ﬁrms indus-
trial organization in manufacturing and the associated impact on productivity and prices.
The PE model takes aggregate income levels and supply schedules as given. The second
module is a constant-returns general equilibrium (GE) model of global trade in all products.
TheGEmodeltakesindustrialstructureasgivenanddeterminesrelativeprices,comparative
advantage and terms of trade. We iterate between these two models in policy simulations,
letting the ﬁrst module determine industrial structure and the second module establish re-
gional incomes and relative costs. Industrial structure (numbers of ﬁrms operating within
and across borders) are passed from the ﬁrst module to the second whereas the structure of
aggregate demand (income levels and supply prices) are passed back from the GE module to
the PE module. Once the models are mutually consistent we have a solution to the multire-
gion general equilibrium with heterogeneous manufacturing ﬁrms. The four steps involved
in the solution algorithm are depicted in Figure 1.
In most policy modeling exercises, applied economists prefer to work with integrated
equilibrium models formulated as systems of equations in which prices and quantities are
11Figure 1: A Decomposition Algorithm
Step 1: Solve one IRTS
spatial price equilibrium
model for each commodity
Step 4: Recalibrate resource
supply schedules and demand
functions in the PE model.
Step 3: Solve the
integrated CRTS general
equilibrium model
Step 2: Recalibrate Armington
demand functions in the GE model





determined simultaneously. In the present application, however, dimensionality and non-
convexities argue strongly in favor of decomposition. When we solve the industrial organi-
zation model on a market by market basis, we avoid dealing with excessively high dimen-
sionalities which otherwise arise when there are large numbers of both goods and markets.
In addition, we ﬁnd that decomposition leads to a signiﬁcant improvement in robustness of
the solution method.
The Melitz model incorporates two types of non-convexity. The ﬁrst is the conventional
interaction of prices, quantities, and incomes. Income effects are the source of most of the
difﬁculties in proving convergence for complementarity algorithms [Mathiesen (1987)]. The
second non-convexity is associated with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation and productivity ef-
fects. While it is possible to solve general equilibrium models including Dixit-Stiglitz effects
[Markusen (2002)], it is well known that even small instances of the problem class can be ex-
tremely difﬁcult. Our decomposition approach seems to avoid these computational difﬁcul-
tiesbyadivide-and-conquer strategyinwhichincomeeffectsarehandledinonesubmodule
and productivity effects in a second module.
12Table 1: PE module; multiregion heterogeneous-ﬁrms partial-equilibrium
Equilibrium Condition (Equation) Associated Variable Dimensions
Zero cutoff proﬁts (ZCP) (14) Nrs : Number of operating ﬁrms R R
Free entry (FE) (17) Mr : Mass of ﬁrms taking a draw R
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (4) Pr : Price index R
Firm-level demand (5) ˜ qrs : Average-ﬁrm quantity R R
Firm-level pricing (7) ˜ prs : Average-ﬁrm price R R
CES wtd. Average ' (12) ˜ 'rs : Average-ﬁrm productivity R R
Pareto dist. Marginal ' (18) '
rs : Marginal-ﬁrm productivity R R
Input-market clearance (19) cr : Composite-input price R
Capacity constraint (20) c
rs : Capacity rents R R
Total Dimensions: 3R +6R2
4.1 Partial Equilibrium Module
The exogenous links that make the PE module operational are the expenditure levels in each
region, ¯ Er,(whichestablishdemandformanufacturedgoods)andtheprices, ¯ cr,andquanti-
ties, ¯ Yr, of the composite inputs to manufacturing. The model needs some ﬂexibility to react
toshocks,however,soweassumeaconstant-elasticityinput-supplyfunctioncentered(each
iteration) on the quantity of inputs used by the sector in the general equilibrium ( ¯ Yr). Input
supply is thus ¯ Yr (cr=¯ cr)
, where  > 0 is the elasticity. If the PE model is consistent with the
general equilibrium cr = ¯ cr, where cr satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions in both modules.
Table 1 summarizes the nonlinear conditions in the PE module and establishes the com-
plementarity between equations and associated variable. In addition to the conditions de-


















and the complementary-slack condition for determining capacity rents (c
rs)




rs (Mr  Nrs)=0. (20)
13As noted above, in a steady-state equilibrium c
rs will equal zero, but the computational
model beneﬁts from an explicit constraint that prevents numeric moves where Nrs >Mr.18
4.2 General Equilibrium Module
TheGeneralEquilibriumModule(GE)isformulatedasastandardconstant-returnsmodelof
world trade in all products. Consumers have preferences over goods differentiated by region
of origin (the Armington assumption). Consider the unit expenditure function associated









Notice that we deﬁne the Armington aggregation directly over the composite of the sector
(k) inputs from region r, which trade at a price of ckr. The total and relative productivity pa-
rameter  ks and krs control the functional calibration. These are the instruments through
which the GE module is affected by the PE solution.
Table 2 summarizes the full set of equilibrium conditions in the GE module. First we









speciﬁc price index, (21), and the composite-input cost function, (6).
Each price (index) has an associated market. Let ¯ ejr be the exogenous endowment of
18This also indicates how the model might be extended into an intertemporal context where Mr cannot ad-
just instantaneously.
14Table 2: GE module: multiregion constant-returns general equilibrium
Equilibrium Condition (Equation) Associated Variable Dimensions
Optimality conditions:
Expenditure function (22) Er : Total Expenditures R
Zero-proﬁts Armington Activity (21) Akr : Armingtion activity level K R
Zero-proﬁts Production (6) Ykr : Sectoral Output K R
Market-clearance conditions:
Input markets (23) wjr : Factor price by type J R
Product markets (24) ckr : Composite-input price K R
Armington-Composite markets (25) Pkr : Price index by commodity K R
Gross supply and demand (26) PE
r : Aggregate price index R
Income balance:
Final demand (27) Wr : Hicks welfare index R
Factor income + tariff revenue (28) Ir : Nominal income R
4R
Total Dimensions +4(K R)
+(J R)























































The challenge to arriving at a fully consistent general equilibrium is to adjust the  ks and
krs (where k = Manufacturing) such that aggregate supply of the manufacturing composite
and relative demands for inputs are consistent with the PE solution. Changes in the number
of ﬁrms will indicate total and relative productivity changes in the composite inputs embod-
ied in the trade ﬂow. Once these productivity changes are incorporated the GE module can
be solved to ﬁnd a new set of gross expenditures, input prices, and input quantities to pass
back to the PE module. At the global solution there are no additional adjustments in the  
and , and the common variables across the PE and GE modules have the same solution
values.
In passing information from the PE module to the GE, we ﬁrst establish total factor pro-










, indicate a de-
crease in the computed PE price index. Through equation (29) the Dixit-Stiglitz effect is
carried over to the GE Armington technology. Finding the relative productivity changes in-
volves ﬁnding the set of krs that are consistent with the value of input demands in the PE






=Nkrs ˜ pkrs ˜ qkrs. (30)
Solving for krs, and noting that Aks is the inverse of the new  , we have
krs =






The recalibration of the constant returns GE ( ks and krs) based on the heterogeneous-
ﬁrms PE solution, and the subsequent recalculation of the ¯ Er, ¯ cr, and ¯ Yr, has proven to be a
robustsolutionmethod. Theiterativeprocedurestopsatthepointthatallvariablescommon
to the PE and the GE are consistent and there is no further recalibration indicated.
5 Nonlinear Least-squares Estimation
5.1 Estimation strategy
Consider that the B = 3R + 6R2 nonlinear conditions in the PE module presented above
might be written as F(x,) = 0, which implicitly maps a set of exogenous parameters ,  2
RA, to a vector of endogenous variables x 2 RB. Let ^  2 fR
^ A : ^ A  Ag denote a vector of
core parameters to be estimated, and let ^ x 2 fR
^ B : ^ B  Bg denote a key endogenous series
(e.g., bilateral trade ﬂows). Our estimation strategy is to ﬁnd the ^  that minimize the sum of
the squared differences between the log^ x and observed logx 0 subject to F(x,) = 0 and an
17additional A   ^ A direct assumptions about the values of the remaining parameters:
minf^ , ^ x g jjlog^ x  logx 0jj2
subject to: F(x,)=0,
and ¯ =k,
where ¯  are the assumed parameters and k is a vector of constants.19 The norm is deﬁned
in logs to be consistent with the empirical trade literature, which often assumes a log-linear
form of the trade equation.
We utilize data that is commonly employed in gravity estimations. The economic data
includes gross manufacturing output by region, bilateral trade ﬂows, and measured tariffs.
Because we are interested in ﬁtting a complete general equilibrium (including various non-
manufacturing sectors), we take these data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
[Dimaranan (2006)], a data set commonly employed in general equilibrium simulations of
tradepolicy changes. These 2001 datatrackfactor endowments, industry production, input-
output relationships and bilateral trade for a broad set of countries. The GTAP data has been
balanced for use in general equilibrium studies (household income equals expenditure, for
example).20
We aggregate the data into twelve regions,
CHN China JPN Japan CAN Canada USA United States
MEX Mexico ANZ Australia and N. Zel. KTW Korea and Taiwan ROA Rest of Asia
LAM Latin America EUR Europe EER Eastern Europe and FSU ROW Rest of World;
and seven aggregate sectors,
19Inadditiontotheassumedparameters, thegeneralequilibriumvaluesofgrossexpendituresandmanufac-
turingoutputaregiveninthebenchmarkdata; ¯ Er and ¯ cr ¯ Yr areobserved. Weestimateconditionalonmatching
these values. The endogenous variable cr is determined (and ﬁxed in estimation) by selecting units such that
cr = ¯ cr =1, which uniquely determines ¯ Yr as it enters eq. (19).
20A key advantage of our data and approach, relative to other studies in the geography of trade literature, is
that we are able to capture aspects of observable reality that are often missing in such studies. For example, we
are able to account for a sizable role for the services sector in the economy, for observable cross-country dif-
ferences in input bundles, and for geographical variation in intermediate demands. The cost of incorporating
such richness is a reduced ability to incorporate a large number of regions in the analysis
18AGR Agriculture MTL Mtls-related industry EIS Other Energy Intensive
MFR Manufacturing SER Services ENG Energy
CGD Savings good.
We focus our estimation of the heterogeneous-ﬁrms model on the aggregate manufacturing
sector (the subscript k is thus suppressed in the remainder of our estimation description).
The other sectors in the general equilibrium are assumed competitive and calibrated via the
usualtechniques.21 Theregionalaggregationattemptstostrikeabalancebetweenourdesire
to capture the relevant geographic trade patterns and provide useful reports given the data
and computational limitations.22
In addition to the economic data we utilize distances between regions to inform trans-
portation costs.23 Consistent with the gravity literature we assume that iceberg trade costs




where  is an estimated distance elasticity.24 In addition, we include rent generating ad val-
orem tariffs as measured in the GTAP data, trs. The c.i.f. import prices, thus, include the
variable trade costs (1+trs)rs.
Taking the GTAP data as given, and given our assumed structure of trade costs, we have
the following candidates for inclusion in ^ :
21We assume an Armington trade structure, with constant returns and perfect competition, in the sectors
other than manufacturing.
22Earlier versions of this paper reported results from a nine-region aggregation (which provided no country-
level reports). In addition, we have explored variations on other regional aggregations of the GTAP data. The
estimated distance elasticities, Pareto shape parameters, and overall welfare analysis of integration where not
substantially altered by our choice of geographic aggregation. The region speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of trade are not
estimated with great precision, and are therefore more sensitive to the particular aggregation.
23Our baseline distance data are described in Mayer and Zignago (2006). In our cross-country aggregation
we must aggregate distances, and we apply Mayer and Zignago (2006)’s distw method for aggregating across
bilateral city pairs to aggregate over bilateral country pairs.
24A normalization of distance is required to pin down the absolute scale of distance-related costs. We scale
distance such that =1 on the shortest link.
19 : the inter-variety elasticity of substitution,
 : the probability of ﬁrm death,
a : shape parameter for the Pareto distribution,
b : minimum productivity parameter for Pareto distribution,
 : distance elasticity of iceberg trade costs,
f e
r : ﬁxed entry cost,
frs : bilateral ﬁxed cost of shipping from region r to region s.
Informingtheseparametersoffobservedbilateralﬂowsisnotmeaningfulunlesswearewill-
ing to signiﬁcantly reduce the parameter space (beyond our implicit assumptions that the
core distribution, substitution, and transport cost parameters are identical across regions).
With R regions there are potentially ^ B =R2 observable ﬂows, but there are at least R2+R +5
parameters. We might eliminate  from the list of parameters; noting that we are interested
in identifying trade costs conditional on second-order curvature.25 We assume that  = 3.8
throughout our analysis following the plant-level empirical analysis of Bernard et al. (2003).
In addition, we directly assume the values  =0.025, f e
r =2, andb =0.2 following Bernard et
al. (2007).26
The primary assumption that we employ to reduce the parameter space is to impose
structure on the ﬁxed costs. Let f
p
r be a ﬁxed cost that is speciﬁc to goods produced in re-
gion r, and f x
s be a ﬁxed cost that is speciﬁc to goods exported to region s. Now consider







r + f x
s + f r
rs, for r 6=s;
f
p
r + f r
rs, for r =s.
When r =s the f x
s term drops out reﬂecting the idea that f x
s is an outward trade barrier. The
f r
rs are idiosyncratic residual bilateral costs. In the initial estimation the f r
rs are constrained
25Our approach is similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in that we estimate trade costs conditional
on .
26Bernard et al. (2007) explain that changes in f e rescales the mass of ﬁrms where as changes in  rescale the
mass of entrants relative to the mass of ﬁrms. For consistency we simply adopt their values.
20to be zero. The number of parameters to be estimated is thus reduced to ^ A = 2R +2. Once
thecoreparametersareestimated, and lockeddown, the systemcan be usedto calculate the
matrix of residual f r
rs which generate an exact ﬁt on trade ﬂows.27
5.2 Estimation Results
The primary purpose of our nonlinear estimation is to complete a calibration of the numer-
ical model. This entails a complete enumeration of the structural parameters necessary to
reconcile the structural model with observed data. The primary parameters of interest are
those that are taken to be common across the world: the shape of the implied Pareto distri-
bution of productivity draws, a, and the distance elasticity of trade costs, . The model links
both these parameters to the geographic pattern of trade.28
We conduct three econometric calibrations of the model. In the ﬁrst, we allow both 
and a to be free parameters; they take the values that minimize the econometric objective,
subject to the constraints deﬁned by the model and our choices of the parameters in ¯ . Very
good estimates of  appear in the literature, and our second set of estimates constrains the
estimation procedure to replicate a commonly accepted value, ¯  = 0.27. As a sensitivity
check, our third set of estimates imposes the constraint ¯  = 0.46.29 Our estimates of key
structural parameters appear in Table 3.30
The interaction between  and a is a key point of interest. Conditional on the bilateral
27Balistreri and Hillberry (2008) use a similar technique of stochastic estimation and subsequent exact-ﬁt
calibration. This entails a consideration that the econometric residuals might logically be interpreted as id-
iosyncratic calibration parameters (as opposed to measurement error).
28 governs the degree to which delivered prices rise over distance. Chaney (2008) shows that a exerts a
substantial inﬂuence on the geography of bilateral trade, via the extensive margin.
29These latter two estimates are taken from Hummels (2001), who estimates  directly off observed trans-
portation cost margins. 0.27 is Hummels’ central estimate, using data from 7 countries that report transport
margins in their international trade statistics. 0.46 is the elasticity of air freight charges with respect to distance
in U.S. data, and Hummels uses this as a plausible upper bound on . Our unconstrained estimate of  lies
well below Hummels’ central estimate, and we treat this as a lower bound.
30In order to characterize the degree to which our procedure ﬁts the observed trade pattern, we conduct a
log linear regression of observed ﬂows on ﬁtted ﬂows. This regression returns an R2 of 0.939, 0.897, and 0.827,
respectively.
21Table 3: Nonlinear estimation results (dependent variable is log bilateral ﬂows; core ﬁxed
parameters are  =3.8, f e =0.05, and b =0.2)
Speciﬁcation
 =free ¯  =0.27 ¯  =0.46
Pareto shape parameter: a 5.171 4.582 3.924
(0.336) (0.227) (0.019)
Distance elasticity:  0.155 0.27 0.46
(0.028)
Source-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost: f
p
r
CHN China 0.036 0.026 0.430
(0.385) (0.396) (0.220)
JPN Japan 0.300 0.340 0.519
(0.239) (0.212) (0.237)
CAN Canada 0.347 0.303 0.228
(0.305) (0.210) (0.103)
USA United States 0.299 0.172 0.328
(0.337) (0.369) (0.065)
MEX Mexico 0.024 0.063 0.316
(0.185) (0.153) (0.088)
ANZ Australia and N. Zel. 0.039 0.030 0.019
(0.014) (0.004) (0.000)
KTW Korea, and Taiwan 0.047 0.027 0.023
(0.088) (0.070) (0.008)
ROA Rest of Asia 0.047 0.026 0.016
(0.074) (0.020) (0.003)
LAM Latin America 0.218 0.255 0.120
(0.262) (0.170) (0.008)
EUR Europe 0.503 0.330 0.753
(0.322) (0.312) (0.157)
EER Eastern Europe and FSU 1.300 0.562 0.222
(0.518) (0.338) (0.022)
ROW Rest of World 3.666 1.280 0.237
(1.449) (0.738) (0.015)
Destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost: f x
s
CHN China 0.258 0.147 20.647
(4.402) (6.379) (15.872)
JPN Japan 0.872 0.493 0.035
(0.986) (0.461) (0.102)
CAN Canada 15.153 13.453 0.0 bound
(11.352) (7.838) (0.006)
USA United States 0.714 0.149 0.0 bound
(1.021) (0.707) (0.000)
MEX Mexico 0.0 bound 0.0 bound 0.0 bound
(0.300) (0.052) (0.000)
ANZ Australia and N. Zel. 6.291 12.004 37.512
(3.184) (6.714) (1.324)
KTW Korea, and Taiwan 0.913 0.346 0.0 bound
(1.003) (0.673) (0.001)
ROA Rest of Asia 1.602 2.067 2.708
(1.618) (1.497) (1.723)
LAM Latin America 8.254 23.532 33.984
(9.412) (20.009) (0.992)
EUR Europe 1.339 0.293 0.0 bound
(1.293) (0.403) (0.000)
EER Eastern Europe and FSU 55.005 35.110 18.628
(18.955) (3.000) (0.505)
ROW Rest of World 142.158 98.561 59.633
(47.798) (6.241) (1.294)
22Table 4: Heterogeneity in the productivity distribution:
'
b for selected values of a
Percentiles
50th 75th 90th 95th
Fitted values of a
^ a=5.171 1.143 1.307 1.561 1.785
^ a=4.582 1.163 1.353 1.653 1.923
^ a=3.924 1.193 1.424 1.798 2.146
Implied estimate from Eaton et al. (2004)
a=4.2 1.179 1.391 1.730 2.041
Value used in Bernard et al. (2007)
a=3.4 1.226 1.503 1.968 2.414
trade pattern, our procedure must assign responsibility for trade reductions to these two
parameters (along with the ﬁxed costs). Our unconstrained estimate of  is ^  =0.155, while
^ a =5.171. Thisisarelativelylowestimateddistanceelasticity,andasomewhathighestimate
for the Pareto distribution parameter.31 As we constrain ¯  to higher values, the estimated
value of a falls. For ¯  =0.27, ^ a =4.582, and for ¯  =0.46, ^ a =3.924.
The lower values of a that occur in our restricted estimates imply greater heterogeneity
in ﬁrm productivities. Table 4 illustrates some features of the productivity distributions im-
plied by different values ofa. For our unconstrained estimate ofa, a ﬁrm with a productivity
draw at the median of the distribution would be 1.143 times as productive as a ﬁrm with
the minimum draw. As a falls, the productivity distribution ﬂattens out. In our subsequent
counterfactual scenarios, we will be employing the constrained estimate a = 4.582, the es-
timate corresponding to ¯  = 0.27. In this case, the median productivity draw is 1.163 times
the size of the minimum draw.
The structural estimation results in Table 3 also contain estimated values of source- and
destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs (f
p
r and f x
s , respectively). Just as other structural procedures
imputevaluesformodel-consistentPs,ourﬁttingprocedureimputesmodel-consistentﬁxed
costs (as well as Ps). Model consistency includes two requirements. First, the size of f
p
r + f x
s
31Asnotedearlier,Hummels’centralestimateof  is0.27. Estimatesofa -whicharetakenfromdistributions
of plant/ﬁrm level market shares - vary, and are conditional on a choice of . Bernard et al. (2007) choose a =
3.4, and the estimates in Eaton et al. (2004) imply a =4.2 under our maintained assumption that  =3.8.
23should be such that the average ﬁrm pays
a+1 
a of revenue, net of tariffs, in ﬁxed costs.32
Second, the elasticity of ﬁtted trade with respect to f
p
r + f x
s should equal 1 
a
 1.33 Condi-
tional on other trade resistances, the model attributes home bias in ﬁtted trade ﬂows to f x
s .
The source-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs, f
p
r , are, in effect, source-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects that help the
procedure to best ﬁt the data under these constraints.
TheresultsinTable3indicatethatbothrelativeandabsoluteestimatesofﬁxedcostsvary
with  and a.34 This is unsurprising, as both the adding up conditions of the model and the
marginal conditions derived by Chaney (2008) link ﬁxed costs to the values of these parame-
ters. Some destinations (i.e. China) have substantial variation across columns in the implied
ﬁxedcostsofimporting, f x
s . Substantialdifferencesacrosscolumnsareunderstandable. Ob-
served levels of import penetration are being replicated across successive calibrations, even
aschangesin aresubstantiallyshiftingtheburdenoftraderesistancefromdistancerelated
ad valorem costs to ﬁxed costs of trade.
Our non-linear estimating system ﬁts the data in a manner quite similar to a conven-
tional gravity equation. An OLS regression of log(^ x) on (logged) drs, (1 + trs), (f
p
r + f x
s ),
ckrYkr, kEs, and Ps returns a perfect ﬁt. This intuitive OLS speciﬁcation relies, of course,
on our non-linear estimates of f
p
r , f x
s , and Ps.35 Following Hillberry and Hummels (2008) we
decompose trade ﬂows into extensive and intensive margins, regressing log Nrs and ˜ prs ˜ qrs
on the determinants of bilateral trade. We report these results in Table 5. The results show
32See eq. (14).
33This relationship is derived in Chaney (2008).
34Standard errors for the estimated ﬁxed costs are generally tighter when the distance elasticity is ﬁxed. Fix-
ing  allows a to be more precisely estimated (exploiting any unexplained variation in the distance elasticity of
trade, for example). More precise estimates of a allow more precise estimates of the ﬁxed costs in the model.
35The ﬁtted values of trade in the regression are fully consistent with optimizing behavior of the agents in the
model. AsHelpmanetal.(2008) show, aParetodistributionforﬁrm heterogeneitycoupled withan assumption
that ﬁxed costs are exporter- and importer-speciﬁc (which is true in the case of our ﬁtted values) generates a
multiplicative gravity relationship (and thus a perfect ﬁt in a properly speciﬁed log-linear regression of struc-
turally ﬁtted ﬂows on the appropriate dependent variables). The estimates here link the ﬂows to variables that
appear in the general equilibrium trade model; there is no need for a summary measure like outward multilat-
eral resistance as described in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
24Table 5: Intensive and Extensive Margins in Fitted Bilateral Trade Flows
 = f ree  =0.27  =0.46
Regressand Nrs ˜ prs ˜ qrs Nrs ˜ prs ˜ qrs Nrs ˜ prs ˜ qrs
Regressor
drs -0.799 0 -1.236 0 -1.804 0
(0.001) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.001) (0)
(1+trs) -7.037 1 -6.240 1 -5.349 1
(0.006) (0) (0.005) (0) (0.005) (0)
(f
p
r + f x
s ) -1.846 1 -1.636 1 -1.401 1
(0.000) (0) (0.000) (0) (0.000) (0)
ckrYkr 1.000 0 1.000 0 1.001 0
(0.000) (0) (0.000) (0) (0.000) (0)
ksEs 1.846 0 1.635 0 1.401 0
(0.000) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.001) (0)
Ps 5.165 0 4.578 0 3.921 0
(0.003) (0) (0.002) (0) (0.002) (0)
constant -11.328 2.114 -9.800 2.281 -8.074 2.585
(0.004) (0) (0.004) (0) (0.004) (0)
Note: All variables are in natural logarithms. Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions have 144 observations and R2 =1.
that average ﬁrm revenues (c.i.f.) rise in tandem with tariffs and ﬁxed trade costs.36 Most
trade responses to the gravity-type variables are observed as changes in the number of ﬁrms
serving a particular market. The regression coefﬁcients in Table 5 can be decomposed in
each case into theory-consistent functions of the structural parameters a, , and .37
Once the core parameters reported in Table 3 are established we can freeze these at their
point estimates and ﬁnd a set of residual bilateral costs, f r
rs, that give us perfect consistency
with observed trade ﬂows.38 From the perspective of the nonlinear estimation these are
36Note that the implications for the intensive margin follow directly from eq. (15).
37Derivations in Chaney (2008) follow through for all but the coefﬁcients on (1 + trs) and kEs. Chaney
does not consider rebatable tariff revenues, and in our framework the elasticity of bilateral trade to (1+trs) is
1 
a
 1. Our estimated elasticity of Nrs with respect to destination expenditures takes the value
a
 1, whereas
in Chaney (2008) it is 1. The difference is that in our framework, high productivity ﬁrms are able to replicate
theirtechnologyandserveeachforeignmarketwithadedicatedexportfacility. Thistreatmentmakes Nrs more
sensitive to market size in our framework.
38Therearea number of potential matrices of residual ﬁxed costs that areconsistent with observedtradeand
25Table 6: Total Bilateral Fixed Trade Costs (frs)
Destination
CHN JPN CAN USA MEX ANZ KTW ROA LAM EUR EER ROW
Source
CHN 0.028 1.005 1.950 0.080 0.010 8.399 2.781 1.813 2.511 0.293 8.962 1.933
JPN 1.986 0.313 2.826 0.111 0.581 4.243 1.539 0.380 1.304 0.227 23.574 2.518
CAN 0.323 0.103 0.048 0.184 4.319 4.739 0.279 2.093 4.894 0.611 35.851 8.298
USA 0.654 0.341 5.180 0.043 3.403 5.077 0.098 0.384 4.893 0.478 64.550 3.970
MEX 1.668 1.146 2.571 0.133 0.138 19.710 0.706 4.606 4.018 1.153 30.763 38.193
ANZ 0.195 0.010 0.183 0.056 0.094 0.026 0.017 0.087 1.788 0.016 3.002 0.397
KTW 0.703 3.016 0.734 0.034 0.110 2.436 0.021 0.244 0.296 0.091 8.074 0.508
ROA 0.449 0.123 0.621 0.017 0.178 2.187 0.080 0.022 2.389 0.068 18.781 1.478
LAM 0.258 0.185 5.982 0.251 1.006 20.952 0.071 0.160 0.036 0.127 1.550 1.670
EUR 0.343 0.394 5.147 0.324 0.895 1.738 0.182 0.592 2.738 0.145 11.974 2.172
EER 0.678 0.583 8.884 1.217 2.050 14.418 0.859 3.406 12.735 0.316 0.195 6.599
ROW 3.132 1.289 25.687 0.378 18.280 23.717 1.494 3.667 40.663 0.510 23.840 0.030
effectively econometric residuals—they allow the structure to ﬁt the data exactly. Alterna-
tively, from the perspective of performing theory consistent counterfactual analysis they are
idiosyncratic calibration parameters.39 Table 6 shows the full matrix of total bilateral ﬁxed
costs including the residual plus the source and destination charges. So, for example, we
might consider that import penetration intoEER is difﬁcult, but it is particularly difﬁcult for
American ﬁrms. On this particular link the total ﬁxed cost of 64.6 is nearly twice as large as
the base destination charge to get intoEER, 35.1.40
6 Counterfactual Simulations
We analyze four scenarios that compare the impacts of tariff and ﬁxed cost reductions:
the estimated parameters. We choose the one that minimizes the squared residual bilateral costs.
39Hillberry et al. (2005) show the usefulness of framing standard general-equilibrium calibration exercises
as the systematic identiﬁcation of idiosyncratic residual parameters. As in any standard econometric exercise
these residual parameters are useful indicators of model ﬁt. In our preferred speciﬁcation, variation in the
estimated frs explains 14 percent of the variation in bilateral trade ﬂows.
40Relatively large ﬁxed costs of entry into aggregated regions like EER may be partially attributed to geo-
graphical aggregation. Our aggregation implicitly treats the collection of smaller countries in EER as a large
integrated market, so large ﬁxed costs are needed to explain a relatively low volume of trade.
26Table 7: Counterfactual Welfare Impacts (% Equivalent Variation)
Scenario
A B C D
CRTS-Tariff Tariff Fix Cost Both
Region
CHN 0.3 1.3 2.9 4.8
JPN 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.7
CAN -0.0 0.1 4.2 4.3
USA 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9
MEX 0.2 0.7 4.3 5.3
ANZ 0.4 1.4 2.0 4.0
KTW 0.4 1.1 5.3 6.4
ROA 0.3 1.0 4.8 6.0
LAM 0.1 0.4 1.4 2.1
EUR 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.5
EER -0.1 -0.3 3.8 4.0
ROW -0.2 -0.7 2.1 1.6
(A) Armington constant-returns formulation with a 50% reduction in manufacturing tariffs;
(B) Heterogeneous-ﬁrms model with a 50% reduction in manufacturing tariffs;
(C) Heterogeneous-ﬁrms model with a 50% reduction in ﬁxed trade costs; and
(D) Heterogeneous-ﬁrms model with both the tariff and ﬁxed cost cuts.
Scenario (A) is a reference case where we assume a standard Armington trade structure and
constant-returns production.41 Table 7 shows welfare changes induced by the tariff cut. Al-
though most regions gain from the tariff cuts, three regions suffer welfare losses (CAN, EER,
and ROW).42 Examining the same tariff cuts in the heterogeneous-ﬁrms model, Scenario (B),
indicates substantially greater gains. Taking the simple-average welfare change across re-
gions the heterogeneous-ﬁrms structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization that are
nearly four times larger than in the baseline case. The simple-average welfare gain of 0.5%
in Scenario (B) may not seem particularly impressive, but consider the following statistics
from our aggregation of the GTAP data: gross manufacturing output is only 26% of world
41We simply run the tariff cut on the GE module without making the iterative productivity adjustments. This
gives us a perfectly comparable constant-returns benchmark to judge the performance of the new theory.
42This is not particularly surprising. At low substitution elasticities (3.8 in this case) the Armington structure
implieshighoptimaltariffs,sothebenchmarktariffstructureislikelytobeneﬁtsomeregions. SeeBrown(1987)
or Balistreri and Markusen (2008).
27gross output, only 17% of manufacturing output is traded to another region, and the simple
average benchmark tariff on these ﬂows is only 9.7%. So the typical tariff cut is less than
5%, and applies to less than 5% of gross output. In this context, an average welfare gain of
0.5% seems quite large. With the exception of the ROW and EER regions, tariff cuts in the
heterogeneous-ﬁrms structure produce larger net welfare gains than the constant returns
benchmark.
In Scenario (C) we examine a 50% cut in the ﬁxed costs associated with non-domestic
trade links. This generates important gains across the board. The results are consistent with
a recenttrade literaturefocussing on the relativeimportance of unobserved(non-tariff) bar-
riers and tariffs.43 In Scenario (D) both the tariff and ﬁxed cost reductions are combined.
There are considerable increases in welfare under Scenario (D) considering that Manufac-
turing is the only sector being liberalized. The simple-average welfare gain under Scenario
(D) is nearly 30 times larger than in the Armington reference case. Notice also that ﬁxed-cost
(or non-tariff barrier) reductions often complement tariff cuts. Absolute welfare increases
of 2% to 6% are considerably larger than most computational estimates of the value of trade
liberalization.44
As noted above, one of the key critiques of current policy simulation models is that they
fail to account for the productivity growth associated with trade liberalization. Table 8 in-
dicates the simulated gains in average productivity across ﬁrms active in their respective
domestic markets. Consistent with the arguments put forward by the proponents of the
heterogeneous-ﬁrms model, our simulations show productivity gains due to liberalization.
Increasedexposuretoexternalmarkets,whetherinducedbyareductionintariffornon-tariff
barriers, induces productivity growth.
The other key component of the model is that trade policy affects the extensive margin.
The number of foreign varieties increases when trade costs fall. The threshold for import
43Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
44See Rutherford and Tarr (2002).
28Table 8: Domestic-ﬁrm Productivity Growth (% Change)
Scenario
B C D
Tariff Fix Cost Both
Region
CHN 0.8 1.4 2.5
JPN 0.5 1.4 2.2
CAN 0.7 4.7 5.5
USA 0.3 1.5 1.9
MEX 1.1 4.2 5.7
ANZ 2.1 2.7 6.1
KTW 1.1 3.4 5.0
ROA 1.3 3.2 5.0
LAM 1.1 1.4 3.0
EUR 0.4 1.5 2.1
EER 0.8 2.8 4.0
ROW 0.6 1.5 2.3
penetrationfallsandmoreforeignﬁrmsﬁnditproﬁtabletoenteragivenmarket. Incontrast,
the effect of changes in trade costs on the number of domestic varieties is not clear. The
number of exporting ﬁrms increases and the proﬁts of all exporting ﬁrms increase, which
induces entry of new varieties. The increased activity of these ﬁrms, however, bids up the
input price. This effect, together with substitution toward imported varieties, induces exit of
domestic varieties with low productivity realizations.
On net, however, consumers will likely beneﬁt from lost domestic varieties because fac-
tor returns increase and the remaining domestic varieties are less expensive. More produc-
tive ﬁrms optimally price lower, so eliminating low productivity ﬁrms depresses the average
price. All of the variety and price effects can be summarized in the solution price index on
manufactured goods, Pr. Table 9 presents the percentage change in the price index across
the scenarios. Further, we break out the variety effects in Table 10. Although the number of
overall varieties falls for many regions, trade growth on the extensive margin combined with
lower domestic prices result in lower overall price indexes and welfare gains.
29Table 9: Manufacturing Price Index, Pr (% Change)
Scenario
B C D
Tariff Fix Cost Both
Region
CHN 0.7 -0.9 -1.0
JPN 0.1 0.3 -0.2
CAN -0.6 -4.3 -4.9
USA -0.2 -2.2 -2.6
MEX -2.4 -3.8 -6.3
ANZ 0.3 -2.4 -3.3
KTW -0.1 -1.7 -2.5
ROA -0.6 -2.1 -3.3
LAM -1.0 -2.4 -3.7
EUR 0.1 -1.4 -1.7
EER -1.0 -3.6 -5.0
ROW -2.3 -3.5 -5.7
7 Conclusion
A broad body of empirical literature documents persistent differences in plant-level produc-
tivity. This literature has also shown that the reallocation of production activities, from less-
to more-productive plants, is an important part of aggregate productivity growth. These ba-
sic characteristics of industrial organization have important implications for international
trade and commercial policy. The unifying theory proposed by Melitz (2003) offers insights
into these implications. Our contribution is to present a quantitative assessment of the ef-
fects of trade cost changes within this structure.
Inthecaseofa50%reductionintariffsontradedmanufacturedgoodsthesimple-average
welfare gains are on the order of four times greater in the Melitz structure than in a con-
ventional trade policy model. These gains are complemented, and compounded, when re-
ductions in the inferred ﬁxed costs are also considered. When we add a 50% reduction in
cross-border ﬁxed costs to the tariff cuts the welfare gains grow to roughly 30 times what is
measured in the constant-returns reference liberalization.
30Table 10: Changes in the Number of Operating Firms, Nrs (% Change)
Scenario
B C D
Tariff Fix Cost Both
Imported Varieties
(extensive margin):
CHN 28.8 196.8 275.4
JPN 54.7 212.2 378.1
CAN 11.0 157.9 190.1
USA 8.9 155.2 178.0
MEX 207.4 158.4 716.9
ANZ 25.9 174.9 230.4
KTW 22.1 206.0 266.0
ROA 20.8 190.2 246.2
LAM 27.2 155.4 225.2
EUR 17.4 178.0 225.2
EER 20.4 168.1 225.1
ROW 12.4 147.9 186.5
Domestic Varieties:
CHN -2.1 -4.8 -7.3
JPN -2.1 -5.8 -8.9
CAN -2.3 -16.1 -19.6
USA -1.1 -6.6 -7.8
MEX -4.5 -14.7 -20.4
ANZ -6.9 -13.0 -20.3
KTW -3.8 -11.7 -17.0
ROA -4.4 -11.0 -16.9
LAM -3.9 -6.0 -11.1
EUR -1.5 -6.4 -8.2
EER -3.2 -9.2 -12.6
ROW -2.7 -5.2 -8.8
Total Varieties:
CHN -1.9 -3.4 -5.4
JPN 8.3 33.9 61.7
CAN -2.2 -14.4 -17.6
USA 0.0 11.1 12.5
MEX 26.6 10.7 87.8
ANZ -6.8 -12.4 -19.5
KTW -2.6 -1.8 -4.2
ROA -3.9 -7.3 -12.2
LAM -3.8 -5.5 -10.3
EUR 0.8 15.3 19.2
EER -3.0 -8.1 -11.1
ROW -2.6 -4.7 -8.1
31Some truth in advertising is in order for our results. First, we employ a novel method for
measuring unobserved ﬁxed costs. We depart from the econometric literature by employ-
ing a nonlinear estimation that includes extensive-form conditions as side constraints. Our
focus is on arriving at ﬁtted values, while maintaining complete consistency between the
econometric and simulation models. Our estimation method is also a stark departure from
traditional calibration methods used to ﬁt simulation models; we do not allow preference-
bias parameters to drive trade. The onus of explaining the observed pattern of trade is on
the theory and the standard parameters that appear in the theory, not on added preference-
bias parameters. The very large ﬁxed costs that we estimate are open to criticism, and we
view them as crude indicators of how big the barriers may be. It is generally accepted by
economists that unobserved trade costs are an important component of the world trade
equilibrium. We follow one of the few paths available, which is to accept the structure fully
and use it to inform unobservables from the observables.
The second major caveat that we place on our results involves the data. We accept the
GTAP data as given and further aggregate it. This is useful in terms of reducing computa-
tional complexity and in allowing us to efﬁciently summarize reports. The GTAP data are
balanced; they have already been ﬁtted to a set of fundamental accounting identities. The
data are consistent with general-equilibrium adding-up restrictions, but the original ﬁtting
procedure weakens the validity of any statistical inference that one might draw from our
estimation.
The usual aggregation biases abound in our data, and we have additional concerns given
the theory’s focus on ﬁrm-level behavior. Our aggregate manufacturing sector is not a satis-
fying deﬁnition of an industry or product. Regional aggregation is also problematic. The ag-
gregate rest-of-world region is actually numerous small disjoint markets rather than a large
integrated market. We probably overstate the ﬁxed costs of entering the aggregate regions
because large ﬁxed costs are necessary for explaining the relative lack of trade with artiﬁ-
32cially large regions.
We thus present our estimates conditional on the particular aggregation of the data, the
assumed structure, and our maintained hypotheses about key structural parameters. We see
important extensions in the area of regional and industry disaggregation. We are somewhat
unique in our development of an econometric method that facilitates directly, and fully con-
sistent, welfare analysis of policy. Others may ﬁnd this departure from standard regression
analysisusefulandrelevant. Weareﬁrmlywithintheempirical-tradetradition,whichplaces
theory, not established statistical methods, as the foundation for analysis. Given the rich na-
ture of contemporary theory we hope our empirical welfare analysis encourages others to
continue developing the literature in this direction.
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